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FINDING HARMONY: LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA V TRINITY WESTERN UNIVERSITY 
Sancho McCann* 
ABSTRACT 
This case comment focuses on what the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
2018 decision in Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University 
tells us about how courts should review the discretionary decisions of 
administrative decision-makers for compliance with the Charter. The 
majority describes this as an application of the framework from Doré 
and Loyola, and I argue that the Court missed a chance to bring that 
framework into conceptual harmony with that from Oakes. The Court 
should be reluctant to use the framework of reasonableness and 
deference set out in Doré and Loyola when the decision-maker (the Law 
Society of British Columbia) fails to produce explicit written reasons 
for their decision. I also argue, though, that the Court didn’t actually 
defer to the Law Society. As a descriptive matter, I argue that the Court 
here used a correctness standard, albeit with a degree of deference and 
leeway akin to that used in the Oakes framework. As a normative 
matter, I argue that this is the correct approach, and that the court 
should highlight the conceptual harmony between the two approaches 
rather than allowing language of reasonableness and deference to 
obscure what courts are doing here. I conclude by presenting a path to 
harmonizing the approaches from Doré and Loyola with that from 
Oakes. 
Citation: (2019) 28 Dal J Leg Stud 95.
 
* JD candidate at the Peter A Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia. I would like to 
thank Professor Margot Young for encouraging me to develop these ideas into an article after a discussion 
during office hours, and James Barth, a friend from 1L who read through an early draft. Much of the content 
has changed since those early stages; any errors are my own. 
96 FINDING HARMONY Vol. 28 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 15, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Law 
Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University.1 
In this case comment, I examine the administrative law questions raised by 
this case and argue that the Supreme Court missed a chance to bring the 
framework from Doré2 and Loyola3 into conceptual harmony with that from 
Oakes.4 
The Court leaves us with three open and intertwined questions: 1) To what 
extent is the analysis focused on the process or the outcome of administrative 
decision-making? 2) When does the Court require written reasons from the 
administrative decision-maker? and 3) Is the Court deferring to administrative 
decision-makers when Charter rights are infringed? 
This lack of clarity stems from unnecessary divergence between the 
Doré/Loyola framework and the Oakes framework. I argue that the Court can still 
capture the harmony between these frameworks. They are not different in nature. 
They flex the same justificatory muscles in different contexts. I first present the 
approach taken in LSBC v TWU, then present a path to harmonizing these tests 
and argue that written reasons should be a factor bearing on the degree of 
deference afforded to the administrative decision-maker. 
BACKGROUND 
Trinity Western University (TWU) is a private Christian liberal arts 
university in Langley, British Columbia. TWU wanted to offer a law degree 
program and, in 2012, submitted its proposal to the Federation of Law Societies 
of Canada (the Federation).5 In 2013, the Federation approved the proposal. That 
approval would typically be sufficient for the school to be an “approved common 
 
1 See Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [LSBC v TWU]. 
2 See Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 [Doré]. 
3 See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola]. 
4 See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 25 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes]. 
5 In 2010, the provincial law societies delegated to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada the authority 
to approve new law programs. 
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law faculty of law”6 for the purposes of the Law Society of British Columbia 
(LSBC). Graduates of the program would be eligible for admission as lawyers in 
BC.7 However, the Law Society Rules provide that the LSBC Benchers could pass 
a resolution to overrule this approval.8 
The LSBC Benchers had concerns with TWU’s covenant which, among 
other things, “calls on students to abstain from sexual intimacy outside of 
opposite-sex marriage.”9 The LSBC described the issue: “[a]s a result of the 
exclusionary impact of these aspects of the Covenant, the issue of whether law 
societies should approve TWU’s proposed law school has divided benchers, 
courts, law societies, the legal profession, and the public generally.”10 
On April 11, 2014, the LSBC Benchers voted on, but failed to pass the 
following resolution:11 
Pursuant to Law Society Rule 2-27(4.1), the Benchers declare 
that, notwithstanding the preliminary approval granted to 
Trinity Western University on December 16, 2013 by the 
Federation of Law Societies’ Canadian Common Law Program 
Approval Committee, the proposed School of Law at Trinity 
Western University is not an approved faculty of law. 
The general membership of the LSBC requested a special general meeting 
and at that meeting, on June 10, 2014, the membership voted (3210–968) to direct 
the Benchers to adopt the resolution to not approve the law school.12 
The Benchers decided to hold a referendum to get even broader input from 
the membership. They “agreed to be bound by the results only if one-third of 
members voted in the referendum and two-thirds of the votes were in favour of 
 
6 Law Society Rules 2015, Rule 2-54(2)(a), online: <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/support-and-resources-for-
lawyers/act-rules-and-code/law-society-rules/>. 
7 Ibid, Rule 2-54(3), formerly rule 2-27 (“[f]or the purposes of this rule, a common law faculty of law is 
approved if it has been approved by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada unless the Benchers adopt a 
resolution declaring that it is not or has ceased to be an approved faculty of law”).  
8 Ibid. 
9 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (Factum of the Respondent at para 16 
[FOR]). 
10 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (Factum of the Appellant at 
para 42 [FOA]). 
11 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 16. 
12 Ibid at paras 17–18. 
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implementing the June 10, 2014 resolution.”13 5951 members voted in favour of 
the resolution to not approve the law school; 2088 members voted against the 
resolution.14 Adhering to the results of the referendum, the Benchers passed a 
resolution declaring that TWU’s proposed law school was not approved. In 
response, BC’s Minister of Advanced Education also withdrew their approval.15 
JUDICIAL HISTORY 
TWU challenged this resolution in the British Columbia Supreme Court, 
claiming that the Benchers’ decision infringed their religious freedom, a Charter-
protected right. The BCSC agreed and said that by binding themselves to the 
referendum results, the Benchers did not conduct the balancing that is required 
when the government infringes a Charter right. The Court quashed the Benchers’ 
resolution, leaving in place the national Federation’s approval of the law school.16 
The LSBC appealed to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. The Court 
dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the BCSC that the Benchers “improperly 
fettered their discretion by binding themselves to the referendum results.”17 
The LSBC then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
At the Supreme Court 
Both parties argued that the appropriate standard of review was 
correctness.18 TWU’s argument was that if the Court were to use a different 
proportionality test depending on whether a right is infringed by statute or by an 
administrative decision-maker, “[a] person’s rights are not uniform but their 
content will depend in part on whether they are subject to interference by 
administrative decision or legislation.”19 LSBC argued for correctness because 
 
13 Ibid at para 20. 
14 Ibid at para 21. 
15 Ibid at para 22. 
16 Ibid at paras 23–24. 
17 Ibid at para 25. 
18 See FOA, supra note 10 at paras 75–90; FOR, supra note 9 at para 50. 
19 FOR, supra note 9 at para 52, citing Tom Hickman, “Adjudicating Constitutional Rights in Administrative 
Law” (2016) 66 U Toronto LJ 121 at 166. 
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this issue demands “a single answer from the courts”20, and because a 
reasonableness analysis that depends on “justification, transparency, and 
intelligibility … cannot be meaningfully conducted in the absence of a single set 
of reasons.”21 
The majority (Justices Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon) 
decided in favour of the LSBC, but under a reasonableness standard following 
Doré and Loyola (both also authored by Justice Abella). The majority held that the 
Benchers, as administrative decision-makers, were entitled to deference under the 
Doré/Loyola framework. Given that the Benchers’ resolution implicated a Charter 
right,22 the reasonableness review requires the Court to ensure that the resolution 
reflects a proportionate balance between the administrative decision-maker’s 
mandate and the Charter right that is burdened.23 The majority found that the 
Benchers’ resolution was consistent with such a proportionate balance. It was 
therefore reasonable and allowed to stand. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a solo 
concurrence that worked toward bringing Doré and Loyola into harmony with 
Oakes. As in Loyola, Chief Justice McLachlin splits from the majority’s approach 
to deference.24 
DISCUSSION 
The Court had an opportunity to clarify the Doré/Loyola framework and its 
relationship with the Oakes test in a manner that would have brought them into 
clearer harmony. 
In Doré (confirmed in Loyola) the Court held that when an administrative 
decision is reviewed for compliance with the Charter, the standard of review is 
 
20 FOA, supra note 10 at para 75. 
21 Ibid at paras 87–89. 
22 Eight of the nine justices found that the Benchers’ decision did infringe upon the religious freedom of the 
TWU community. My focus here is how that infringement had to be balanced against the statutory mandate 
given to the LSBC. 
23 There is a disagreement between the majority and the concurring and dissenting justices regarding the role 
that Charter values play compared to Charter rights. This comment does not focus on that aspect of the 
opinions. See generally LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at paras 166–175, Rowe J, concurring; LSBC v TWU, 
supra note 1 at para 115, McLachlin CJC, concurring. 
24 See Loyola, supra note 3 (McLachlin CJC and Moldaver J did not use the Doré analysis in their concurrence). 
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reasonableness rather than a full Section 1 Oakes analysis.25 The reasonableness 
review of Doré asks whether the “decision reflects a proportionate balancing of 
the Charter protections at play.”26 This proportionality analysis looks at both 
minimal impairment and balancing.27 By contrast, the Oakes analysis has a 
preliminary step that asks whether the limit of a Charter protection is designed to 
serve a pressing and substantial objective. It then has the court assess whether 
there is a rational connection between the limitation and the objective, whether 
the impairment of the Charter protection is as minimal as possible in light of the 
objective, and whether there is a proportionate balance between the deleterious 
effects of the limitation, the pressing and substantial objective, and the salutary 
effects actually resulting from the implementation.28 
As a descriptive matter, I argue that the Court here used a correctness 
standard, albeit with a degree of deference and leeway akin to that used in the 
Oakes framework. As a normative matter, I argue that this is the correct approach, 
and that the court should highlight the conceptual harmony between the two 
approaches rather than allowing language of reasonableness and deference to 
obscure what courts are doing here. 
Instead of leaving us with conceptual harmony, the Court leaves us with 
several open and intertwined questions stemming from the above discrepancy. 1) 
To what extent is the analysis focused on the process or the outcome of 
administrative decision-making? 2) When does the Court require written reasons 
from the administrative decision-maker? and 3) Is the Court deferring to 
administrative decision-makers when Charter rights are infringed? 
Whose Proportionate Balancing? 
Does the decision under challenge need to merely reflect a proportionate 
balancing? Or does it need to reflect the decision-maker’s proportionate balancing? 
 
25 See Doré, supra note 2 at paras 3–5. 
26 Doré, supra note 2 at para 57. 
27 See Loyola, supra note 3 at para 40. 
28 See Oakes, supra note 4 at paras 73-74; Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at paras 96-
97. 
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If the decision needs to only reflect a proportionate balancing (for example, one 
that the reviewing court happens to work through), then the review becomes 
entirely outcome-focused. This approach to review would not distinguish 
between good-faith efforts to balance and processes that are improperly tainted 
by invidious motives. As long as the outcome is within the range of outcomes 
that the court could imagine as striking a proportionate balance, the decision 
would stand. 
Can proportionate balancing (on the part of the decision-maker) even take 
place through a referendum process? The concern is that the decision-maker is 
prevented from doing proportionate balancing if they rely exclusively on the 
outcome of a referendum and are bound by its results. The majority addresses 
the appropriateness of the referendum process: 
The Benchers concluded that they were authorized under the 
LPA to proceed as they did. Section 13 of the LPA provides 
that the LSBC members can elect to bind the Benchers to 
implement the results of a referendum of members in certain 
circumstances. This provision indicates the legislature’s intent 
that the LSBC’s decisions be guided by the views of its full 
membership, at least in some circumstances. However, s. 13 
does not limit the circumstances in which the Benchers can elect 
to be bound to implement the results of a referendum of 
members. The Benchers were therefore not precluded from 
holding a referendum merely because all of the circumstances 
described in s. 13 were not present.29 
Even if Section 13 does not limit the Benchers this way, the requirement for 
proportionate balancing might. The majority even says: “that reasonableness 
review is concerned both with ‘the reasonableness of the substantive outcome of 
the decision, and with the process of articulating that outcome’.”30 
Certainly, it was open to the Benchers to seek the “guidance or support of the 
membership as a whole.”31 However, that does not imply that a binding 
referendum is a display of discretion and proportionate balancing. Nor does a 
referendum preclude proportionate balancing. It is possible to exercise discretion 
 
29 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 49. 
30 Ibid at para 52. 
31 Ibid at para 50. 
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and proportionate balancing even after holding a referendum, but without written 
reasons, we cannot know whether this happened. The majority says this does not 
matter, though.32 They say it is sufficient that the Benchers were “alive to the 
issues.”33 
The majority relies on Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District) for the 
proposition that not all administrative decision-making requires formal reasons 
and that requirements “vary with the context and nature of the decision-making 
process...”34 In Catalyst, the Court held that “there was no duty to give formal 
reasons in a context where the decision was made by elected representatives 
pursuant to a democratic process.”35 However, this is a different context. Catalyst 
is distinguishable because the elected representatives in that case were elected by 
the general population, and democratically accountable to the general population. 
In this case, the elected representatives of the LSBC are elected only by the 
membership of the LSBC, and not democratically accountable to those whose 
rights are infringed by their decision. In Catalyst, the Court said: 
To demand that councillors who have just emerged from a heated 
debate on the merits of a bylaw get together to produce a coherent 
set of reasons is to misconceive the nature of the democratic process 
that prevails in the Council Chamber.36 
However, when an administrative decision-maker who is insulated from 
democratic accountability to the general population infringes a Charter-protected 
right, we can require that the process have a different nature, at least if the Court 
is going to continue to review these decisions under the guise of deference. This 
may all be beside-the-point, though. The standard of review is strict—in fact, 
 
32 Ibid at para 55 (“… the LSBC was not required to give reasons formally explaining why the decision to 
refuse to approve TWU’s proposed law school amounted to a proportionate balancing of freedom of 
religion with the statutory objectives of the LPA”). 
33 Ibid at para 56 (“[as] the Benchers were alive to the issues, we must then assess the reasonableness of their 
decision. Reasonableness review requires a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be 
offered in support of a decision” [emphasis in original]). 
34 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 53; Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at 
para 29 [Catalyst]. 
35 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 53. 
36 Catalyst, supra note 35 at para 29. 
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approaching correctness—despite the language of “reasonableness” and 
“deference.”37 
Is This Really Deference? 
Reasonableness may make sense as the standard of review for administrative 
decision-makers more generally, when their actions do not burden a Charter right. 
But when their actions do burden a Charter right, the Court has clarified that 
reasonableness necessitates a proportionate balancing. 
The reviewing court must consider whether there were other 
reasonable possibilities that would give effect to Charter 
protections more fully in light of the objectives. This does not 
mean that the administrative decision-maker must choose the 
option that limits the Charter protection least. … However, if there 
was an option or avenue reasonably open to the decision-maker that would 
reduce the impact on the protected right while still permitting him or her to 
sufficiently further the relevant statutory objectives, the decision would not 
fall within a range of reasonable outcomes.38 
This is a correctness review, or at least as much as is Oakes. The requirement 
to choose an option or avenue that has a lesser impact on the protected right 
(while sufficiently furthering the statutory objectives) is akin to the minimal 
impairment component of the Oakes framework. It obscures the law to call this a 
reasonableness review. 
Chief Justice McLachlin observed: 
I would note that relying on the language of “deference” and 
“reasonableness” in this context may be unhelpful. Quite 
simply, where an administrative decision-maker renders a 
decision that has an unjustified and disproportionate impact on 
a Charter right, it will always be unreasonable.39 
In the case of a yes-or-no decision, this review even more obviously 
collapses to a correctness review, but this can get lost in language like “the range 
 
37 See LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 118, McLachlin CJC, concurring. 
38 Ibid at para 81 [emphasis added]. 
39 Ibid at para 118, McLachlin CJC, concurring. 
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of possible, acceptable outcomes.”40 Given the binary choice available to the 
Benchers, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes was a single outcome: that 
the LSBC not approve the law school. 
 Conceptual Harmony 
The Court can still capture the conceptual harmony between Doré/Loyola 
and Oakes. They are not different in nature. They flex the same “justificatory 
muscles”, just in different contexts.41 The Doré/Loyola analysis raises the same 
considerations as in Oakes, adjusted to make conceptual and grammatical sense 
when there is “no law” to review.42  
Oakes incorporates context and deference just as does Doré/Loyola.43 And 
Doré/Loyola is robust oversight: the word “deference” might even be misleading.44 
The Court has emphasized that this is “strong” reasonableness not “watered-
down” proportionality.45 
If we must use the word deference when reviewing Charter infringements in 
the administrative law context, a helpful alternative might be qualified deference.46 
The framework set out by Doré and Loyola is still inspired by Oakes. Yes, there is 
a shift in emphasis toward the proportionality step, but this shift in emphasis, and 
the deference, is only given to the extent that the decision-making process 
displays factors that warrant such deference. 
The factors that attract a degree of deference are similar across both tests. 
These factors include proximity to the facts of the case,47 expertise and 
 
40 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 52, citing Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47. 
41 Doré, supra note 2 at para 5; Loyola, supra note 3 at para 40; LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 82. 
42 See Doré, supra note 2 at para 39; LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 114, McLachlin CJC, concurring. 
43 See RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 160, 127 DLR (4th) 1, (“[t]he 
tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If 
the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because 
they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement”); see also R v Malmo-
Levine, 2003 SCC 74 at para 177 (not in the Oakes context, but says, “[w]hile somewhat different 
considerations come into play under a Charter analysis, it remains important that some deference be accorded 
to Parliament in assessing the utility of its chosen responses to perceived social ills”). 
44 See LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 (“…where an administrative decision-maker renders a decision that has an 
unjustified and disproportionate impact on a Charter right, it will always be unreasonable” at para 118, 
McLachlin CJC, concurring). 
45 Ibid at para 80; Loyola, supra note 3 at para 38. 
46 Alternatively: conditional deference. 
47 Doré, supra note 2 at para 54. 
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specialization48, and the balancing of competing interests in the context of 
conflicting evidence.49 Moreover, these factors are precisely why the legislature 
would have delegated decision-making authority in the first place, so will often 
be present in the administrative-law context. However, consistent with LSBC v 
TWU, there should be an additional factor at play in the administrative-law 
context in order to attract deference when a Charter protection is infringed: 
transparency of reasons. In LSBC v TWU, because the Court lacked reasons from 
the decision-maker, the majority was forced to create its own reasons, its own 
balancing, and focused its analysis on the outcome.50 
Several of the justifications for deferring to administrative decision-makers 
are not furthered without written reasons. Doré mentions that administrative 
decision-makers are a “…rich source of thought and experience about law…”51 
Doré also sees these administrative bodies as doing adjudication.52 Professor Mary 
Liston refers to this “institutional dialogue” as a balance between judicial 
accountability and public-law accountability.53 Explicit, written reasons would 
further each of these views of deference. 
CONCLUSION 
When a Charter right is burdened by an administrative decision or by a law, 
courts should apply the same stringent review. In LSBC v TWU, the court applied 
such a review. Doré/Loyola and Oakes are just two flavours of the same inquiry. 
To the extent that the Court continues to defer to administrative decision-makers 
in their assessment of proportionality, a lack of explicit and transparent reasoning 
should be a factor that weighs against such deference. Encouraging decision-
makers to explicitly reason through this balancing process furthers the 
 
48 Ibid at para 47. 
49 See Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 993; Doré, supra note 2 at para 50. 
50 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 56, Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon JJ, and para 
300, Côté and Brown JJ, dissenting. 
51 Doré, supra note 2 at para 27, citing John Evans, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution 
and the Common Law” (1991) 29 Osgood Hall LJ 51 at 73. 
52 Ibid at para 30 (“courts do not have a monopoly on adjudication”). 
53 Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State” in Colleen M 
Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) 77 at 113. 
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justifications of administrative deference and can help reinforce the norm that it 
is the government’s duty to balance competing rights in good-faith. 
 
